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LEGISLATION
PROCESS IN DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP CASES
INTRODUCTION
From the first days of the republic the federal courts have been the forums for
cases involving suits between citizens of different states. Federal jurisdiction of
diversity of citizenship actions is based on the constitutional provision that,
"The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens
2
This constitu", and its implementing legislation.
of different States . .
tional provision sprang from the desire of the founding fathers to guarantee each
citizen a fair hearing regardless of the existence of sectional prejudices.3 Implicit
in that desire was the hope that no citizen would be deprived of the opportunity
of seeking redress of injuries solely because the injury was sustained at the hands
of a person from another state.
In view of the purpose of the constitutional provision it would be expected
that litigants would always have resort to the federal courts when the dispute
involved citizens of different states. This is not, and never has been, the case.
The implementation of the diversity of citizenship provision is subject to rules
respecting jurisdiction, venue 4 and service of process which substantially limit
its use. The purpose of this article is to examine these rules in an attempt to
determine whether the limitations they impose are within the spirit of the
original constitutional enactment.
JURISDICTION

At the outset Congress curtailed diversity jurisdiction by requiring that the
amount in controversy be not less than $5001. Today the jurisdictional amount
is fixed at $3,000. 6 The courts imposed further restrictions by requiring that the
existence of diversity be pleaded most specifically 7 and by denying jurisdiction
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332.
3. Chief Justice Marshall in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
61, at 87 (1809), stated: "However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states
will administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description,
it is not less true, that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject,
or views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has
established national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen,
or between citizens of different states."
4. Although the terms are oft-times used interchangeably, clarity requires that, throughout this article, "jurisdiction" and "venue" be used only in the original meanings. "Jurisdiction" will refer only to the federal court's general power to decide the issue in suit, i.e.,
without consideration of service of process. "Venue" will be concerned with the particular
federal court entitled to hear the suit.
5. Act Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
6. See note 2 supra.
7. Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 302 (1798); Turner v. Enrile, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 6
(1799); Course v. Stead, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 20 (1800); Wood v. Wagnon, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
1 (1804); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 US. (2 Cranch) T1 (1804); Montalet v. Murray, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 29 (1807).
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where one plaintiff and one defendant were residents of the same state, although
all other parties to the same action were of diverse citizenship.8
The decisiveness of these early restrictions left little room for argument and
faint hope for a subsequent reversal. The jurisdictional requirements as we know
them today are much the same as in the early days of our federal court system.
They cannot, however, be said to limit the full use of diversity of citizenship
in any save the most reasonable respects.
VENMuE

The requirements of venue, in the cases wherein federal jurisdiction is founded
on diversity of citizenship alone, are specific and unambiguous. The United
States Code provides that, "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only
on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought
only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside."0
Although the 1948 revision of Title 28 of the United States Code wrought major
changes in the title as a whole, the portion of former section 112 of Title 28,
which became the diversity venue section of our present code, remained substantially the same. The terms "all plaintiffs" and "all defendants" replaced
the words "the plaintiff" and "the defendant" since the latter terms had been
so construed, 10 and the word "reside" was substituted for the phrase "whereof
he is an inhabitant" for the same reason."' Hence the case law from 1911 when
the last thoroughgoing amendment took place is still applicable. Barring a
waiver of venue' 2 the only two places where the action may be brought are those
explicitly set forth in the statute.
That a defendant may be sued in the district of his own residence cannot be
seriously questioned.13 It is also clear that the district of the plaintifft s residence
is a proper forum for a diversity action. 14 Reason would dictate that where the
action is in the plaintiff's district all the defendants need not reside in the same
district or state; nor would there be any reason to assume that all the plaintiffs
must reside in the same district when suing in the defendant's district. The
limitations imposed by venue, viewed in itself, are negligible. They effectively
express the original intent of the framers of the Constitution.
8. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 US. (3 Cranch) 159 (1505).
9.

2US.CA.§ 1391(a).

10. H.R. Rep. No. 303, Z0th Cong., Ist Sess. app. 126 (1947).
11. Ibid.
12. Where an action is based solely upon diversity of dtizenship, venue requirements do
not predicate the power of the federal court to adjudicate. They are requirements which
are designed for the convenience of the parties and may be waived by them. Olberding v.
Inlinois Cent. R.R, 346 US. 338 (1953); Sweeney v. Carter Oil Co., 199 U.. 252 (1905).
13. Sweeney v. Carter Oil Co., 199 U.S. 252 (190S); Sherman v. Collin, 117 F. Supp.
496 (S.D. Me. 1953); Katz Exclusive Millinery, Inc. v. Reichman, 107 F. Supp. 263 (W.D.
Mo. 1952).
14. Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 303 (1919); Harris v. Deere & Co., 128 F. Supp. 799
(E.D.N.C. 1955), aff'd, 223 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1955); Shaffer v. Tepper, 127 F. Supp. 892
(EDl. Ky. 1955); Rhodes v. Barnett, 117 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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PROCESS

Service of process is governed by Rule 4(f) which states, "All process other
than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the
state in which the district court is held and, when a statute of the United States
so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state."'u
Thus, in the absence of statutory exceptions,' 0 service of process in any state
other than the one wherein the court is located is prohibited. 17 Original process
to bring in third party defendants is subject to the same limitations. This does
not, however, preclude the waiver of objections to service requirements.18 Nor
does it preclude situations which fall within the other provisions of Rule 4 for
substituted service under which personal service may be permitted in a state
other than the one wherein the district court is located. 19
Rule 4(f) is an expansion of the previously extant rule governing civil process
in the federal courts. Theretofore, except for a limited number of statutory
exceptions, process ran only within the district in which it was issued.20 The
extension was the fruit of constant agitation by members of the bar who found
the old rule inconvenient and frustrating. Many of the states are divided into
several federal judicial districts. Due to the limitation of service of process to
the district within which process was issued, the federal courts were rendered
powerless to assert jurisdiction over parties in issues of which they would otherwise have taken cognizance. In order to obviate the difficulties arising as a
result of this restriction the more extensive Rule 4(f) was adopted. 2 '
Yet, even under the extension of Rule 4(f), service of process remains a persistent stumbling block where diversity of citizenship is involved. As stated in
our discussion of venue, a citizen of state A may bring an action against a
citizen of state B either in the federal district court of state A, the domicile of
the plaintiff, or in the federal district court of state B, the domicile of the defendant.22 But, as a practical matter, a plaintiff is often unable to bring an
action in his own state because the defendant cannot be found and served
therein. Thus, under our present rules, while a federal court may have jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action, a lack of an adequate procedural
device to assert that jurisdiction over the person may prevent it from exercising
its substantive remedy.
CHANGES

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar as they relate to diversity of
citizenship actions, create several problems calling for revision of those rules.
15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).

16. Congress has the power to provide for service of process anywhere in the United
States. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
17. See note 15 supra.
18. Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 130 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1942).
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d), (e).
20. Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S.619 (1925).
21. Holtzoff, Origin and Source of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1057, 1063 (1955).
22. See note 9 supra.
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Before revision can be considered, however, let us briefly review the history of
the rules to ascertain the agency empowered to promulgate the change.
The Constitution provides, "The judicial power of the United States, shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish."2 3 This provision seems to establish
dearly the Supreme Court as its own master, certainly insofar as promulgation
of rules for the regulation of its own judicial affairs. It is less lucid, on the
question of rules for regulation of the inferior courts. The power vested in
Congress to establish those inferior courts clearly implies that Congress should
also have the power to regulate them. A question raised in constitutional law
is whether the Congress has the power to delegate its legislative function. It
has been held that Congress may delegate rule-making authority so long as
sufficient criteria are given the delegate for the exercise of the delegated functions 4 The most significant occurrences in the development of federal procedure began with an enabling act in 1934, authorizing the Supreme Court to
make procedural rules to unite the practice in law and equity.2 This meant, in
addition to the unification, that federal procedure in law actions in the inferior
courts would lose its multiform nature, no longer being bound by the procedural
rules of the various states.26 The criterion under which Congress delegated its
authority to make rules in this instance was that the rules would "neither
abridge, enlarge, nor modify, the substantive rights of any ltigant.L -7
As the first step in carrying out the task assigned by Congress, the Supreme
Court appointed an Advisory Committee of eminent attorneys to prepare a
draft of such rules.2 s The Advisory Committee received help and recommendations from many sources, and while the Supreme Court, for obvious reasons of
necessity, delegated much of the actual work to the Advisory Committee, it still
exercised close and careful supervision. The adopted rules were submitted to the
75th Congress. Hearings were held by the Judiciary Committees of both houses
and Congress adjourned without any adverse legislation. Because of the absence
of adverse legislation the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective as
of September 16, 1938V 9
Thus, the rules at present are promulgated by the Supreme Court under a
delegation of congressional power. Changes within them can be wrought by the
court, subject to the approval of Congress. That approval will be based on
whether such changes adhere or fail to adhere to the limitations imposed by the
criterion established in the Enabling Act which delegated the power.- Any
23. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
24. Hampton Co. v. United States, 276 U.. 394 (1923).
25. Act June 19, 1934, c. 651, §§ 1, 2, 48 Stat. 1054.
26. Procedure in actions at law in the federal courts had prior to this time been determined by the rules of procedure of the courts of the states wherein such federal courts were
situated. Act Sept. 29, 1789, c. 21, §2, 1 Stat. 93; Act May 19, 1823, c. 63, § 1, 4 Stat. 278;
Act June 1, 1872, c. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197. As a result, a multiplicity of federal procedure
existed until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
27. See note 25 supra.
28. 55 S. Ct. XX.,X (1935).
29. 1, Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5 (1950).
30. See note 25 supra.
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changes which conflict with those limitations are not within the authority of the
Supreme Court, but can be made by the Congress itself under its power to
regulate the lower federal courts.
As noted, the prime purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide an unbiased
forum for disputes; to avoid the possibility of sectional prejudices.31 That purpose is well advanced by the present rules regarding jurisdiction and venue. It
appears to be thwarted unreasonably by the rules governing service of process.
Although there are numerous recorded instances of dismissal of diversity
actions because of the plaintiff's inability to serve process on individual defendants, their tabulation would not portray realistically the full deterrent of
process requirements. More often the effect is realized before litigation and the
plaintiff, made aware of the difficulties, does not bring his action.
Even more disturbing is the case where there are two indispensable defendants
residing in different states. Although plaintiff may bring his action in the state
of one of the defendants, the action will be dismissed because process cannot
be effected under Rule 4(f) against the other indispensable defendant.82 Under
such a fact situation, it is impossible for suit to be brought in a federal court.
Because the present rules impose this unwarranted bar upon the institution
of a diversity action, it is well to consider the possibility of altering them.
Might not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be amended to allow service
of process throughout the United States and its possessions, in all diversity of
citizenship actions wherein the requirements of venue and jurisdiction have been
otherwise met? Such an amendment would certainly come closer to the fulfillment of the original purpose of diversity jurisdiction.
The above change alone, however, would be less than adequate. It would
foster "plaintiff-favoring" situations. As noted previously under present venue
provisions diversity actions are maintainable in either the plaintiff's or the defendant's district. 3 3 Given unlimited service of process in such actions, virtually
every plaintiff would lay his action in his own district. Diversity jurisdiction
should favor neither party. Thus, this change, alone, would carry the present
injustice to the opposite extreme.
A modification of the venue provisions, made concurrently with the change
in process requirements, would resolve the difficulty. All that is required is to
substitute for the existing optional venue provision (which grants venue in
either plaintiff's or defendant's district) a provision limiting venue to the district wherein the alleged cause of action arose. This would insure that neither
plaintiff nor defendant will be forced to litigate in a district in which he has no
voluntary prior dealings.
In every diversity case a determination of the locus of the cause of action
would first have to be made. Such determination does not present any unusual
or extraordinary difficulties. A motion by defendant to dismiss for want of
proper venue would involve no more perplexing a problem than that entailed by
31. See note 3 supra.
32. Schadl v. Boyer, 56 F. Supp. 897 (ED. Pa. 1944).
33. See note 9 supra.
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a determination of residence. Certainly the allegation of the locus of the cause
of action is no more susceptible to dispute than an allegation of residence.'
This proposed venue change would be inapplicable, of course, whenever the
cause of action arose outside the United States, yet involved citizens of different
states. In such cases, the present rule of venue would be the only reasonable
solution. Including it as an express exception in this class of cases would do no
violence to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which now contain many such
exceptions.
Congress is empowered to make these changes. At present, however, Congress
has vested the Supreme Court with rule-making power. The present rules, as
noted, were promulgated by the Supreme Court and approved, through silence,
by Congress. All revisions or additions proposed must fall within the Enabling
Act which made the delegation. It is almost certain that the Court is not
empowered to bring about both changes hereinbefore recommended.
The overriding prohibition of the Enabling Act is that no existing substantive
rights of any litigant be abridged by the rules. The extension of service of process from the confines of the federal judicial district to the territorial boundaries
of the state was upheld by the Supreme Court to be a procedural rather than a
substantive change.35 The further extension herein suggested would appear to
involve a mere difference in degree.
Venue provisions, however, will very probably require legislation. No attempt
to alter venue has as yet been made under the Enabling Act. Venue in diversity
actions is the subject of express congressional enactment. This factor does not
conclusively preclude court alteration of venue. Such alteration would not
affect the right to sue, which is clearly substantive, but rather the situs of the
suit, a seemingly procedural matter. In any event, the change can be made.
Congress itself definitely has the authority and has exerted it in the past.
The changes proposed, it is felt, would correct an existing inequity. They
would, admittedly, tend to increase the number of federal actions. The spirit
of the times is adverse to diversity jurisdictions. Many respected authorities
have urged its abolition. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has decried the "mounting
mischief inflicted on the federal judicial system by the unjustifiable continuance
of diversity jurisdiction."3 6 On the other hand an increase in the number of
federal cases is not an evil in itself, and should not be a damning consideration.
At any rate, while we have diversity jurisdiction should it not be consistent with
the spirit of the Constitution and the intent of the founding fathers?
34. tAs to difficulties in determination of "domicile," see for example, In re Dorrance's
Estate, 115 N.J.Eq. 26S, 170 AtL 601 (1934); In re Dorrance's Estate, 30) Pa. 151, 163 At].
303 (1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 660 (1932). See also Tweed and Sargent, Death and
Taxes are Certain-But What of Domicil, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 63 (1939).
35. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 US. 433, 445 (1945); Industrial Addition Ass'n v. Commissioner, 323 US. 310,314 (1944).
36, Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 34S U.S. 48, 54 (1954).
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PROPOSED ADOPTION OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN THE STATE OF NEW
YoRK.*-Comparative negligence has been defined as that negligence attributable to the plaintiff which when joined with the negligence of the defendant in
proximately causing the injury of the plaintiff goes in reduction of the recovery
in the proportion that the negligence of the plaintiff compares with that of the
defendant.1 This doctrine has take on more important aspects in the United
States in the past few decades. Several states have enacted statutes which
permit a modified form of comparative negligence to exist in varying degrees. 2
An example of this is the Wisconsin statute which limits recovery to plaintiffs
whose negligence ". . . was not as great as the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought. ' 3 The state of Mississippi has adopted the "pure"
form of comparative negligence 4 under which a person can recover damages
regardless of the degree of his own negligence unless, of course, it be the sole
cause of the injury.
The immediate factors which prompted this discussion of the subject of comparative negligence are the proposed bills in several of the legislatures of the
eastern states, and in particular, the proposed amendments which have been
presented to the New York legislature in the past several sessions.5
One proposed amendment in the 1956 New York legislative session" which
would adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence in this state reads, in part,
as follows:
"Contributory Negligence; diminution of damages . . . the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff shall not bar a recovery, but the damages recoverable shall be reduced
to such extent as the court deems just and'7equitable and having regard to the amount
of negligence attributable to the plaintiff."
* Subsequent to the writing of this article the proposed legislation discussed herein was
defeated.
1. Whatley v. Henry, 65 Ga. App. 668, 16 S.E. 2d 214, 220 (1941).
2. Geo. Laws § 105-603; Miss. Code § 1454; 1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1151; S.D. Laws
of 1941 c. 160 p. 184; Wis. Stat. § 331.045.
3. Wis. Stat. § 331.045.
4. Miss. Code § 1454; This form of comparative negligence also exists in certain state
and federal statutes which only apply to certain limited fields and are not discussed to any
great length because of the differences in scope and application: See Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 53; Iowa Code § 8158; Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. 66:238; Mass.
Laws c. 229 §§ 2,2A,20; N.M. Stat. § 22-20-3; Tenn. Code Ann. § 2628-30 (Williams 1934).
5. 178th Session 1955, Assembly Bill Int. no. 2835, Print no. 2970, Senate Bill Int. no.
2572, Print no. 2741; 177th Session 1954, Assembly Bill Int. no. 2086, Print no. 2187, Senate
Bill Int. no. 1097, Print no. 1142; 176th Session 1953, Assembly Bill Int. no. 1038, Print
no. 1057, Senate Bill Int. no. 25, Print no. 25; 175th Session 1952, Assembly Bill Int. no.
192, Print no. 192, Senate Bill Int. no. 42, Print no. 42; 174th Session 1951, Senate Bill Int.
no. 479, Print no. 479, 173rd Session 1950, Assembly Bill Int. no. 189, Print no. 189, Senate
Bill Int. no. 277, Print no. 277.
6. 179th Session, Assembly Bill Int. no. 1862, Print no. 1935, Senate Bill Int. no. 39,
Print no. 39.
7. Proposed Civil Practice Act amendment § 255b. This language will also be Incorporated by this amendment into §§ 119 and 131 of the N.Y. Decedent's Estate Law. Assembly Bill Int. no. 674, Print no. 679 introducing § 426-a amending the Civil Practice
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The vast importance of this proposed amendment and its impact on the current law of New York can best be appreciated by contrasting the current law
with the law as it would stand if the amendment were enacted.
TnE CUPmnNT NEw

YoRx LAW

New York has remained a firm advocate of the doctrine of contributory
negligence which was first set forth in England in the classic case of Butterfield
v. Forrester.8 Under this doctrine a plaintiff whose negligence contributed in
any way, no matter how slight 9 to cause his injury, is barred from any recovery.
The defendant, who in many cases is the main cause of the injury, is allowed
to escape without any liability whatsoever regardless of the degree of negligence
he exhibited as long as it falls short of a willful tort.10 This exclusionary rule
of contributory negligence does not, of course, exclude every negligent plaintiff
from recovery. If he is to be precluded, his negligence must have been a prodimate cause of his injury.11 The prime reason for New York's adherence to the
contributory negligence rule is the feeling that liability should be confined to
the party who has been the proximate cause of the injury; that where the
plaintiff's negligence contributed to his injury, it is a proximate cause thereof
and bars recovery.'The inflexible rule of contributory negligence, to which New York clings, is
not capable of rendering exact justice. Is there any reason to justify absolution
of a concededly negligent defendant from his complete lack of care because be
can show the plaintiff has also been, to a degree, a proximate cause of the
accident? Of course not, but such is the only course under present New York
law.
EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED AmNDENFT

The primary effect of the introduction of comparative negligence to the law
of New York would be the replacement of the rigid rule of contributory negligence. The scales of justice would not fall from a position of full recovery, in
the event of complete freedom from contributory negligence, to no recovery
Act has also been submitted to the 1956 legislative session. This proposed amendment would
permit a restricted doctrine of comparative negligence to apply only when there has been
a stipulation by the parties and their attorneys for a trial without jury. The plaintiff would
be entitled to recovery only if "the degree of negligence or fault on the part of the defendant
is found to be greater than that of the plaintiff." If the court found the plaintiff entitled to
recover, judgment would be rendered, "in favor of the plaintiff for the total amount of
the damages assessed less such proportion as may be allocable to the plaintiff by reason of
his negligence."
8. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
9. See Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929); Grippens
v. New York Cent. R.R., 40 N.Y. 34 (1869); RydelI v. Greenhut & Co, 140 App. Dlv. 926
(1st Dep't 1910).
10. Tidd v. Skinner, 225 N.Y. 422, 122 N.E. 247 (1919); Chapman v. 'ew Haven R.R.P,

19 N. Y. 341 (1859).
11.

Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 314 (1920).

12. Grippens v. New York Cent. R.R., 40 N.Y. 34 (1869). But see Arctic Fire Ins. Co.
v. Austin, 69 N.Y. 470 (1877).
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at all at the slightest trace of contributory negligence,' 3 but will come to rest
at many different settings depending upon the actual comparative negligence of
the parties involved. For example, car operator X by his 10% negligence in
not putting out his hand when making a left hand turn, will not be barred from
a partial recovery against car operator Y who by his negligent lack of control
and lack of observation has contributed 90% of the cause of the accident. The
10% negligence on the part of plaintiff X held to be a proximate
cause would
4
only go to the reduction by 10% of his recoverable damages.1
Under a literal reading of the proposed amendment, New York would change
its position of having the slightest degree of contributory negligence bar recovery 5 to a position where any injured party in an accident would be entitled
to a recovery regardless of the degree of negligence he contributed, 1 as long as
it was not the sole cause of his injuries. A reading of the Mississippi statute and
cases indicate that they also proceed on this theory of recovery regardless of
the plaintiff's own negligence. Thus in the aforementioned example of the negligent car operators, the more negligent car operator Y would have a right of recovery for 10% of the damage sustained by him. In the case where Y's damages
are a great deal more than X's the ultimate result would be that X would pay
instead of receiving compensation for an accident to which he has only contributed 10% of the cause. If in our example X's damage is $100 and Y's
damage is $1,000, theoretically the end result would be X's paying Y $10. This
result is not harsh or unjust since the plaintiff X has been a proximate cause of
the accident and suffered only one-tenth the actual damages Y incurred.
Another change in the current law of New York would be the elimination
of having the plaintiff plead and prove his lack of contributory negligence as
one of the essential elements of his case. 17 The plaintiff's contributory negligence would be an affirmative defense pro tanto and would only go to the
diminution of damages in the proportion to his negligence. 18
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

In considering the proposed amendment primary concern must be given to
the feasibility of its application. To determine just how the amendment would
affect the courts of New York in this respect, regard might be given to its
application in states which have enacted general comparative negligence statutes.' 9 The only state that has a statute as broad in application as the proposed amendment is Mississippi where the statute has operated successfully
since its enactment in 1910.20 In Mississippi the degree of negligence is left
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

note 9 supra.
note 7 supra.
note 9 supra.
note 7 supra.
Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929).
note 7 supra.
note 2 supra.

20. Miss. Code § 1454,

"...

the fact that the person injured .. .may have been guilty

of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but damage shall be diminished . .. in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person injured."
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for jury determination. 2 ' The courts of that state do not consider the practice
to the jury for answers in the form of special
of submitting special questions
22
essential.
all
at
verdicts
Wisconsin has a more restricted comparative negligence act which limits recovery to a plaintiff whose negligence "... . was not as great as the negligence
of the person against whom recovery is sought."2 3 Under this statute, the
Wisconsin courts submit special questions on the main points of the caseF4 to
the jury and they are answered in the form of special verdicts. The reason for
these special verdicts has been stated to be the enabling of the trial judge "to
evaluate the answers of the jury to the questions of fact and the questions of
damages as to conformity to the evidence. 2e 5 In a recent article Gerald P. Hayes,
21. Whiles Lumber & Supply Co. v. Collins, 186 Miss. 659, 192 So. 312 (1939); Tendall
v. Davis, 129 Mliss. 30, 91 So. 701 (1922). But see Goodman v. Lang, 15S Mis. 204, 130
So. 50 (1930).

22. Ibid.
23. Wis. Stat. § 331.045.
24. Padway, Comparative Negligence, 16 Mfarq. L. Rev. 1,23 (1931). Form of Sp-cial
Verdict Relating to Comparative Negligence on Complaint and Counter-Claim.
Question 1: In operating his automobile at the time and immediately preceding the
collision was the defendant Smith negligent in respect to speed and control of his car?
Answer: ..................
Question 2: If you answer question 1 "Yes", then answer this: Was the defendant Smith's
negligence a cause of the collision?
Answer: ..................
Question 3: In operating his automobile at the time of and immediately preceding the
collision, was the plaintiff, Jones, negligent in respect to the speed of his car?
Answer: ..................
Question 4: If you answer question 3 "Yes", then answer this: Was the plaintiff Jon&s
negligence a cause of the collision?
Answer: ..................
Question 5: In the event you answer all of questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 "Yes", then answer
this: Was the negligence of defendant Smith greater or less than the negligence of the
'
plaintiff Jones? Answer by writing in the word "greater" or the word "qes .
Answer: ..................
Question 6: In the event you answer all of questions 1 and 2 "Yes", and 3 or 4 "No"a,
then answer this: What is the full damage Jones has sustained?
Answer: ..................
Question 7: In the event you answer all questions 1, 2, 3, 4 "Yes"I,and S "greater", then
answer this: What is plaintiff Jones' damage as diminished in the proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to him?
Answer: ..................
Question 8: In the event you answer questions 1 or 2 "No", questions 3 and 4 "Yes",
then answer this: What is the full damage Smith has sustained?
Answer: ..................
Question 9: In the event you answered all of questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 "ZYese, and question
5 qess", then answer this: What is defendant Smith's damage as diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to him?
Answer: ...............
25. Hayes, N.Y. Should Adopt a Comparative Negligence Rule, 27 N.Y.S. Bar As3'n.
Bull. at 289 (July 1955).
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former President of the Wisconsin State Bar Association, stated, "a comparalaw cannot successfully operate with the use of a general
tive negligence
26
verdict".
In states where the comparative negligence statute requires the jury to distinguish between slight and gross negligence, 27 or other definite divisions of
negligence, 28 special verdicts would be advantageous to ascertain whether the
jury found the negligence to be within the statutory limitations. When using
the less detailed rule of straight comparison, however, which would be in effect
under the proposed act of New York, the special verdict might prove more
cumbersome than helpful. It would seem that the same result could be more
expeditiously accomplished by a charge in which the principle of the comparative negligence doctrine and its application to the particular case would be
elucidated.
Whether New York adopts the system of questions and special verdicts or
simply relies on a charge to the jury, it seems clear that the added duties placed
on the jury should be no deterrent to the enactment of the proposed amendment.
Another effect of the proposed amendment will be the further aggravation
of an already existing procedural problem of impleading. As the law in New
York now stands, if a plaintiff does not join in his action one of a number of
joint tort-feasors, the joint tort-feasors sued do not have the right to implead
the absent party29 and neither do they have a right of contribution from him.30
This aspect of the law has been criticized 3' but, as a practical matter, the plaintiff usually does join all the tort-feasors to insure satisfaction of any judgment
awarded. However under the doctrine of comparative negligence, the practical
effect would be completely changed. The plaintiff would find it more advantageous in most situations to sue the joint tort-feasor who has suffered the least
damage. In this way the defendant's counter-claim, if permitted, would not be
as great and therefore the plaintiff's recovery would be increased. The position
of the tort-feasor who has been unfortunate enough to be the least injured and
has a relatively high percentage of the negligence is further aggravated when
there is more than one person injured, as all parties would sue this same tortfeasor. Consider, for example a three car traffic accident in which A, B and C
26. Ibid.
27. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1151, "Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the defendant
was gross in comparison."; S.C. Laws of 1941, c. 160, p. 184; The wording of this statute
is the' same as the statute in Nebraska.
28.

Wis. Stat. § 331.045 (1949)

"...

not as great as... ."; Geo. Laws § 105-603 ".

if the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the consequences to himself caused by
the defendant's negligence, he is not entitled to recover. In other cases the defendant is
not relieved, although the plaintiff may in some way have contributed to the Injuries
sustained."
29.- Fox v. Western New York Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289 (1931).
30. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 211a. Under this section in order for a party to be liable
for contribution, he must have been joined in the action. See Triglianos v. Henry M. & Co.,
189 Misc. 157, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 618 (1947).
'31. See, Gregory, Tort Contribution Practice in N.Y., 20 Corn. L.Q. 269 (1933).
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are damaged in the amounts of $800, $1,000 and $100 respectively and contributed to this damage in the degrees of 20%, 40% and 40% respectively.
The course they would follow is clear. A and B would each in separate suits
sue C. In the action by A, the court would find A entitled to 80% of his $800
damage and C 60% of his relatively small claim of $100 on the counter-claim.
The final judgment would be in favor of A for $580. In a subsequent suit
brought by B against C, the court would allow B 60% of his $1,000 claim and
C 60% on his claim with the final liability of $540 upon C. In neither of
these cases, could C implead and the end result of the actions would find C with
a total liability of $1,120.
If an impleader and counter-claim were permitted, C, when sued, would bring
in the other party and the result would be as follows:

$ Paid

Party

Recoverable
damage

A
B

$640
$600

$320

C

$60

$320

to A

$ Paid
to B
$200

$400

$ Paid
to C
20
$40

Ultimate recovery
or liability
+ $420
+ $240

-

6o0

This same result may possibly be obtained if the courts interpret section 193
of the Civil Practice Act 32 to be broad enough to permit C to make a motion
for a joinder of B as a "conditionally necessary" party. In the event that C
is not permitted to make this motion, the inequity of this situation could be
rectified by a single change in the Civil Practice Act which would entitle one
joint tort-feasor to implead or, in the alternative, have a right of contribution
against the other tort-feasor.
The foregoing illustrations show that for the proposed amendment to operate
at the highest degree of efficiency, a right of counter-claim is necessary. Under
the present New York law once the defendant's negligence is established a
counter-claim becomes academic since a defendant guilty of any degree of
contributory negligence is automatically barred from recovery. Under the proposed "pure" comparative negligence statute wherein the "contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall not bar a recovery,"33 the counter-claim becomes
most important. If there were no right of counter-claim, the defendant incurring
damages would have to bring a separate action which would result in a multiplicity of actions and quite possibly and probably a finding by the second jury
of different relative degrees of negligence. On the other hand, if a counterclaim were permitted under the all inclusive language of section 266 of the Civil
Practice Act,34 the damages and degrees of negligence of all concerned parties
and the amount of net recovery by one or more of the parties could be ascertained and made res judicata in a single action. For e.sample, in an action
brought by P, who incurred a damage of $2,000 and who contributed 10% of
32.
33.
34.
them

N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 193.
See note 7 supra.
"A counter-claim may be any cause of action in favor of the defendant or some of
against the plaintiff's or some of them ... ."
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the negligence to the accident, against D, who incurred damage of $500 and
was responsible for the remaining negligence, D would normally counter-claim
his damages. The court would settle the rights of both parties concerned by
awarding P $1,800 minus the 10%o of D's damage ($50) for which plaintiff is
responsible.
OBJECTIONS

The additional burden of the increased litigation that the act would supposedly bring to the already overcrowded New York courts has been voiced as
an objection. 35 While such might seem to be the logical result when a cause of
action is given to a group heretofore precluded from recovery, Wisconsin found
the contrary true. There negligence litigation was substantially reduced after
enactment of a comparative negligence statute.8 0 Such a statute is conducive
to out of court settlements. The "all or nothing" attitude is eliminated and the
parties, or more likely, their insurance companies, are more likely to recognize
the varying degrees of negligence and settle accordingly. Thus many cases are
disposed of without litigation.
It has also been argued that the increase settlements or actual verdicts cause
an inordinate rise in insurance costs. 37 Even conceding this, may we not ask
whether insurance rates should be a deterrent when the settlement or verdict is
given only to the individuals who have been negligently injured?
CONCLUSION

The philosophy inherent in the doctrine of comparative negligence has already
made deep inroads into the judicial structure of the State of New York. The
doctrine of contributory negligence has been supplanted to some extent in the
field of employer-employee relationship38 and entirely in the specific area of
Workmen's Compensation.89 The courts themselves, in their interpretation of
the law, have displayed an obvious sympathy for the proposed change. In cases
where defendant's negligence is on a relatively high level and plaintiff's contributory negligence relatively small, there is a known tendency to characterize
the defendant's acts as willful and to disregard the plaintiff's negligence. 40
The "last clear chance" doctrine was born of a similar purpose in courts bent
on achieving more equitable results than the doctrine of contributory negligence
would allow. 41 Under the "last clear chance" rule, a plaintiff may recover his
35. Benson, Can New York State Afford Comparative Negligence?, 27 N.Y.S. Bar Ass'n.
Bull. 291 (July 1955).
36. See note 25 supra. See also, Averback, Comparative Negligence Legislation: A Cure
for Our Congested Courts, 19 Albany L. Rev. 4, 18 (1955).
37. See note 35 supra.
38. N.Y. Employers' Liability Law; N.Y. General Business Law.
39. N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law.
40. See, Weld v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 210 N.Y. 59, 71, 103 N.E. 957, 961 (1913).
41. Srogi v. New York Cent. R.R., 257 App. Div. 903, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 45 (4th Dep't 1939),
aff'd 261 App. Div. 1039, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 508 (4th Dep't 1941), aff'd 287 N.Y. 707, 39 N.E.
2d 307 (1942); Grossman v. Hudson Transit Corp., 276 App. Div. 1074, 96 N.Y.S. 2d 674
(1st-Dep't 1950); Esposito v. City of N.Y., 275 App. Div. 912, 89 N.Y.S. 2d 781 (1st
Dep't 1949).
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damages in full notwithstanding his own negligence when he proves the defendant actually knew42 of the plaintiff's peril and had the ability to avoid the
accident but did not use ordinary care in doing o43
It is submitted that the objections to the proposed amendment lack substantial merit sufficient to overcome the obviously more equitable results which
would spring from the change. New York throughout its history has been forward looking in striving for progressive and equitable legislation. Should it
now hesitate to embrace an improved doctrine of law which has proven not only
to be feasible but clearly equitable and just?
42. Panarise v. Union Ry., 261 N.Y. 233, 185 N.E. 84 (1933).
43. See note 41 supra. See also Restatement, Torts § 479 (1934).

